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RELIGION, ORGANIZATION AND COMPANY LAW  





























This paper examines the effect of changes in corporate law in the mid-nineteenth century – 
incorporation and limited liability – on the ownership, control and socio-economic objectives of a 
Quaker family firm between 1841 and 1972. The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) were well-
known for adhering to internalized quasi-legal rules and self-governance, and had a strong 
reputation, which persists today, for trust, integrity and honesty in all business dealings. We read 
existing archival research on Quaker firm Huntley & Palmer (the biscuit manufacturer) against the 
grain to trace how incorporation and limited liability fundamentally changed its capital structure and 
the family’s control of the firm and which, in turn, led to a gradual weakening of its social ambitions. 
We argue that changes to the law are akin to changing the rules of the game within which players’ 
play, and we show how Quaker quasi-legal rules became subordinate to corporate law resulting in 
















In this paper, we address the effect of socio-legal changes in corporate law in the mid-
nineteenth century (incorporation and limited liability) on the ownership, control and socio-
economic objectives of a Quaker family firm between 1841 and 1972. Specifically, our paper jointly 
analyses how the Joint Stock Act, 1844 and the Limited Liability Act, 18551, substantively widened 
the scope of incorporation and permitted limited liability for shareholders. We locate these legal 
changes as an ‘anchor’ point from which to trace the effect on the ownership structure of a Quaker 
firm, on competitive dynamics, and on the balance between its financial and socio-economic 
objectives.   
  The relationship between religious entrepreneurs and capitalism has intrigued scholars for 
decades, from Weber to Benjamin, and yet the relationship is still recognized as under-developed 
(eg, Tracey, 2012), despite the publication of various volumes that explore the importance of 
religion on entrepreneurship and commerce (eg, Roberts, 2012; Tawney, 2017). Much of this 
scholarship has noted how members of religious communities were often at the forefront of 
industrial activity, none more so than the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). In this respect, 
Quakers in the United Kingdom are an especially interesting and important case study. Quakers 
have a reputation for honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, and for the way in which Quaker businesses 
in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries foregrounded socio-economic ambition. Quaker 
family partnerships were also often very successful and innovative, credited with playing a major 
role in the development of accounting rules, the cheque, modern banking, public infrastructure, and 
cooperative enterprise (Walvin, 1997; Windsor, 1980). Quakers explicitly drew upon their religious 
principles and ethics in the organization of their ventures (Fincham, 2017; Tracey, 2012), and they 
also pioneered socio-economic objectives such as the provision of employee welfare benefits, 
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 Given that the Acts were implemented to provide investment opportunities for the investor class and stimulate 
economic growth (Harris, 2013), our paper analyzes the effects of the Acts jointly.  
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pension schemes, and subsidized housing for employees (e.g., Burton and Turnbull, 2019; Walvin, 
1997).  
Our paper focuses on one of the most well-known Quaker businesses2, Huntley & Palmer 
(H&P), a large biscuit manufacturer located in Reading, Berkshire in the United Kingdom, in order 
to analyse the effect of conversion from a family partnership to a limited liability company in 1898 
on its ownership, control and socio-economic ambitions. We chose to examine Huntley & Palmer 
as it is one of a number of successful Quaker businesses that was established as a family partnership 
by members of the Quakers in the early-to-mid nineteenth century and which later incorporated in 
the 1890s. However, despite being a well-known brand, it is rather puzzling that it has received little 
scholarly attention, unlike the Quaker chocolatiers. Our paper begins with a short overview of 
Quaker business history. We follow this with a discussion of the context and intent of the changes 
in corporate law that introduced incorporation and limited liability in the UK. We then describe our 
research method and proceed to discuss the case analysis of Huntley & Palmer (H&P). We follow 
this with an extended discussion and conclude with final remarks and pathways for future research.  
The Quakers 
The economic and social contribution of Quakers businesses in the UK throughout the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries has recently attracted scholarly interest from management 
scholars, theologians and historians (e.g., Burton and Hope, 2018; Burton and Turnbull, 2019; 
Dandelion and Angell, 2017; King, 2014; Walvin, 1997; Windsor, 1980). For example, Burton and 
Hope (2018) highlight the importance of corporate responsibility and ethics to the Quaker logic of 
business, and draw parallels with contemporary movements, such as the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals and B-corporation accreditation, that seem, at least in part, to replicate Quaker 
concerns. Similarly, King (2014) argues that ‘Quakernomics’ is a distinctive form of ethical 
                                                 
2 The term ‘Quaker business’ might encompass issues of ownership, control, management, culture, and ethos. 
For our purposes, we take it to mean a business established by members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers).   
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capitalism that deserves renewed attention, while Burton and Turnbull (2019) emphasise the 
complex inter-relationships between the cooperative and social behaviours of Quakers and religion, 
as well as the power of the Quaker kinship and network ties, that underpinned the success of many 
Quaker businesses.  
Originating with the ministry of George Fox (1624-1691), at the heart of Quaker theology is 
the idea of the ‘Light within’ that manifests itself in interactions with the social world through the 
Quaker testimonies to Truth, Integrity, Equality, Peace and Simplicity (Muers and Burton, 2018). 
Early Quakers were heavily persecuted during the seventeenth century, and excluded from political 
and public life, as well as from universities. Thus, although there was a high ‘hedge’ between 
Quakers and the State (Dandelion, 2019) until the late-1800s, Quakers turned their attention to the 
opportunities afforded by business and commerce where they were well-known for their honesty, 
hard work and yeoman spirit (King, 2014).  
Though small in number3, Quakers had a significant impact in industry and produced a 
remarkable and disproportionate number of businesspeople, scientists, thinkers, and campaigners 
for justice, peace and human rights (Furtado, 2013; Raistrick, 1950). While Quaker involvement in 
the chocolate industry is well-documented (e.g., Cadbury, 2010; Rowlinson, 1988; 1995; Rowlinson 
and Hassard, 1993), much less well-known is that Quakers were also pivotal in the development of 
industries, such as banking, life assurance, accounting, iron, biscuits, shoes, soap, chemicals, 
brewing, metals, glass, wool, railways, and canals (eg, Child, 1964; Freeman, 2013; Raistrick, 1950; 
Prior and Kirby, 1993; Walvin, 1997; Windsor, 1980). Because of their belief in the Inner Light, 
Quakers were self-disciplined, self-reliant and confident in their individual and collective roles in 
contributing to business and society. This conjunction of inner religious beliefs, outward 
entrepreneurial action, and extensive social networks meant that Quakers were well-placed to both 
shape and take advantage of the national and global development of trade and the early forms of 
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 Sahle (2015, 3) estimated Quakers have, at most, represented 1.8% of the population in 1700. 
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capitalism associated with the industrial revolution. For instance, Quaker businesses were important 
actors in the trans-national mobilisation of people and resources, including the British cotton 
industry which relied upon the ‘Triangular Trade’ between West Africa, the Caribbean and Britain 
(Cazden, 2013). Thus, the Quaker network acted not only as a religious network, but also as a well-
functioning business network providing access to capital and resources from other Quaker 
industrialists (Kirby, 1993; Turnbull, 2014). The reach and influence of Quakers also extended to 
wider management practice. Windsor (1980), for example, argued that Quakers were instrumental 
in innovations such as fixed product prices, ‘just’ weights and measures, formal accounting and 
auditing procedures, bills of exchange, the cheque, employee welfare provisions, works’ councils, 
pensions, subsidised housing, medical and dental care provision, profit-sharing, and cooperative 
ownership.  
Because of their opposition to conventional Christian religious practice, and separation from 
the State and its associated functions and institutions, the Quakers had to create their own 
organizational forms, practices and quasi-legal rules (e.g., record keeping in all forms, including 
accounts for debt). Their culture of writing and inscription – as evidenced by their assiduous practice 
of record-keeping and providing written advice to members – was distinctly modern, compared to 
pre-scientific, oral cultures. Furthermore, given their earlier separation from the State, Quakers 
created an internal system of quasi-legal rules that governed and moderated the behaviour of its 
members, including business owners. The quasi-legal rules were frequently published by Britain 
Yearly Meeting (the corporate body), and oversight was enacted through local and area meetings.        
An intriguing and under-explored part of the story is how and why most of the Quaker 
businesses lost their Quaker character in the first-half of the twentieth century. Today, the most 
famous – Cadbury, Rowntrees, and H&P – are now only ‘Quaker’ by historical association. Possible 
explanations can be located in the family business literature and in Quaker scholarship. For example, 
in the stewardship stream of the family business literature, a number of scholars have argued that 
transgenerational succession poses significant risks to maintaining a stewardship culture across 
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successive generations as leadership becomes dispersed (eg, Pearson & Marler, 2010). In Quaker 
scholarship, a few authors have discussed social and political drivers. Cadbury (2010, 223), for 
instance, posited that the emergence of the welfare state in the UK in the first-half of the twentieth 
century reduced the need for a ‘charitable Quaker businessman’, and that the social reforms in the 
UK distanced religion from business. Sleapwood (forthcoming) analysed the effect of World War I 
on Quaker businesses through the lens of one Quaker firm - Albright and Wilson, a chemical 
manufacturing firm. Sleapwood argues that Government control of the firm introduced significant 
commercial challenges, and a willingness to accept military and defence contracts in contradiction 
to the Quaker testimony to peace. As a consequence, Sleapwood charts the departure of key Quaker 
figures due to their pacifist principles – and the increase in non-Quaker board members willing to 
accept such contracts – which she associates with the business ceasing to be distinctively Quaker.  
Other Quaker scholars have examined changes internal to the Society. For example, King 
(2014) and Walvin (1997) highlight that reducing membership of the Society meant fewer Quakers 
able to take up management roles in Quaker businesses. Along similar lines, Tibbals (2014; 2017) 
noted that expulsions from the Society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for non-payment 
of debts or marrying a non-Quaker depleted the number of Quakers in membership, thereby 
weakening Quaker kinship and network ties. However, explanations that rely solely upon reduced 
membership have been contested. In a study on Quaker membership, Stroud and Dandelion (2005) 
have noted that while Quaker membership has fallen in recent years, membership actually rose 
between the mid-1860s and early 1970s from c13,800 to c15,800. Thus, while the reasons for a 
decline in Quaker’s establishing and managing successful businesses is complex and multi-faceted, 
our paper seeks to provide an alternative exogenous explanation that situates changes in corporate 
law in the mid-nineteenth century as an anchor event that ultimately weakened Quaker social 
ambitions.   
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Changes in corporate law   
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the vast majority of businesses in the UK, including 
Quaker-owned businesses, were structured as family partnerships via partnership agreements 
(Sleapwood, 2017). The family partnership was the original venture capitalist enterprise, reinvesting 
profits as capital for further investment (Windsor, 1980). It had the distinction of unlimited liability, 
such that the partner’s liability for debt was unlimited, and extended beyond the assets of the 
business in the event of failure. However, the partnership was also an extension of an individual’s 
personality, and symbolically the partners often lived in their place of work (Taylor 2006, 24). 
The challenges of sustaining a family-based partnership in the late nineteenth century were 
similar to today: ensuring effective succession, minimizing the potential for debt, and raising capital 
to finance growth and expansion (Turnbull, 2014). Until the Joint Stock Act 1844 was passed, only 
certain organisations were permitted to benefit from incorporation, either via common law, 
parliament, royal charter, or prescription (Holdsworth, 1922). Incorporation, under one of these 
methods, typically came with monopoly rights, and so was granted only in exceptional cases, such 
as to finance overseas ventures (for example, the East India Company was awarded a charter in 
1600), and to finance companies involved in capital-intensive infrastructure projects like canals, 
railways4, and utilities, where there was a public benefit to incorporation.  
Even though incorporation was rare, unincorporated joint-stock associations began to appear 
in the late 18th century as groups of individuals used trusts and mutual covenants to effect an 
organisational form somewhat akin to a corporation, albeit bereft of legal personhood. However, 
this opened up opportunities for fraud with the result that many investors lost money in the early 
19th century having invested in joint-stock associations (Ireland, 2010).  Investors also complained 
that the constraints on legal incorporation was limiting economic growth (Harris, 2013)5. 
                                                 
4
 The first railway – known as the ‘Quaker line’ (Stockton & Darlington Railway Company) – was formed in 1821 by 
a group of Quaker businessmen as a limited company. 
5
 Harris (2013) suggests that there were just 124 incorporated joint stock companies in 1824. 
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Eventually, the 1844 Joint Stock Act enabled a much broader scope of incorporation and became a 
right for almost anyone involved in business. As affirmed in the landmark case, Salomon v Salomon 
(1897), the corporation became: an autonomous legal entity; it continued to exist even after the 
original founders (shareholders) had left the company or died; the shareholders acquired rights and 
responsibilities – for example to appoint managers; and, ownership (by shareholders) was separated 
from control (by managers). An important consequence of the Act was the ‘economic’ sphere was 
largely separated from the ‘social’ sphere in how a corporation was defined and understood. In other 
words, corporations were understood as economic institutions, and social concerns were understood 
as largely a negative externality to be managed by governments and other public agencies (Banerjee 
2008). As Perrow (2002, 41) noted, this was not “a mistake, an inadvertence, a happenstance in 
history, but a well-designed plan devised by particular interests who needed a ruling that would 
allow for a particular form of organization”.   
The emergence of the corporation as a singular, distinct entity ran counter to a basic Quaker 
belief in the centrality of the individual and their consequent suspicion of collectivist models of the 
world.  This was also an important reason why many Quakers disliked trade unions and the socialist 
focus on collective action, power and social class (Freeman, 2013). Hence, the notion of the 
company as a unitary entity, separate from its constituting individuals, was contrary to their 
individualistic ideology.  
Limited liability quickly followed incorporation via the 1855 Limited Liability Act. Prior to 
the Act, default on a liability to another was based upon a system of debt and credit, and thus an 
individual’s character, personality and morality were of utmost importance (Finn, 2007; Taylor, 
2014). Such a system was well-aligned with the Quaker ethos, but it had long been criticized based 
on the argument that it stymied innovation and growth as unlimited liability disincentivized wealthy 
individuals from investing in risky ventures. Such individuals were also being lured to invest their 
money in France and the state of New York where forms of limited partnerships had emerged 
(Smith, 2004, p. 72; Kempin, 1960). After half-a-century of contested debate on the merits or 
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otherwise of introducing limited liability, it was eventually introduced via an amendment to the 
Companies Act 1855 to encourage the working and middle class to participate more fully in the 
economy, and to provide more investment opportunities for the rentier class (Kahan, 2009). The 
rentier class was also becoming increasingly powerful, as evidenced by the fact that between 1815 
and 1875 British investors exported a capital surplus amounting to about half a billion pounds (Jenks 
1927, p. 333). 
For Quakers, the issue of limited liability struck to the core of their belief system as honesty 
in trade, including the avoidance of debt, was a condition of membership of the Religious Society 
of Friends from its inception in the 1650s. Quakers had a reputation for being scrupulously honest, 
and they abhorred the idea and practice of failing to pay one’s debts. Hence, for most Quakers – 
with some notable exceptions – “the possible inability of a limited company to meet its debts fully 
was regarded as immoral” (Cottrell, 1980, 41). 
An important effect of the new joint-stock model was that it clearly differentiated between 
the rights and responsibilities of shareholders and the management team. This was a significant 
departure from the partnership model favoured by the Quakers, where a small number of closely-
related participants were actively involved in managing the business, sharing ownership of the 
assets, and having joint and several unlimited liability. If there were external investors, then these 
were invariably well-known, if not related, to the partners and were expected to take an active 
interest in the business. The new shareholder structure associated with incorporation also typically 
increased the number of shareholders quite significantly – partly because of a growing trend towards 
lesser denominations of ordinary shares (Payne 1967) – while there was no requirement for the 
shareholders to know one another. This was quite different from the Quaker partnerships where 
there were typically a small number of owners who knew one another intimately. Decision-making 
by the shareholders in this new context was also quite different.  Under the shareholding structure, 
decisions were made by majority vote, a decision-making process with which Quakers have 
 
11 
traditionally been uncomfortable (Morley, 1993). Moreover, a corollary of these changes was that 
ownership became steadily more divorced from control.  
The combined legal changes, however, were initially slow to have an effect ‘on the ground’ 
(Payne 1967). For instance, Jefferys (1938) estimated that in 1885 limited companies accounted for 
only between 5 and 10 percent of all-important business organisations, excluding sole traders and 
public utilities. Thus, partnerships and sole traders were still very much the dominant form of 
business organisation in the late nineteenth century. Three significant events led to a much greater 
rate of incorporation in the latter part of the nineteenth century. First, the Long Depression of 1873 
to 1879 saw an increasing number of bankruptcies which highlighted the benefits of incorporation. 
Second, a ready supply of cheap money became available in the 1890s when the Bank of England 
official minimum rate of discount stood at only 2 per cent. Third, in 1877 the company lawyer 
Francis Palmer published a guidebook, ‘Private Companies; or how to convert your business into a 
private company, and the benefit of so’, in which he observed that even small partnerships and sole 
traders could incorporate using nominees to meet the minimum requirement of seven members 
(Palmer, 1877). Palmer’s book was influential – by 1900 it was in its eighteenth edition – and the 
rate of incorporation steadily increased from 500 per year between 1856 and 1865 to 6700 per year 
between 1908-1914 (Ireland, 1984; 1996). 
The new legal ‘rules of the game’ struck at the heart of the Quaker belief system – that is, 
debts should be honoured – and encouraged excessive risk-taking, a lack of personal responsibility 
and an “un-English” approach to business (Taylor, 2014, 7). Taylor (2006, 22) concluded, “An array 
of contemporaries believed that whereas the partnership system of commerce was predicated on 
notions of character, trust and credit, companies marginalised these qualities and encouraged their 
members to behave immorally”. As we shall see, given the competitive pressure to incorporate, most 
of the prominent Quaker businesses incorporated in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries: Consett Iron Company (1864), Ransomes (1884), Bryant & May (1884), Truman & 
Hanbury (1888); Reckitt (1888), Albright & Wilson (1892), Allen & Hanbury (1893); Carr (1894), 
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Fry’s (1896), Crosfields (1896), Rowntree (1897), Huntley & Palmers (1898), Cadbury’s (1899), 
Baker Perkins (1902), C & J Clark (1903) Swan Hunter (1903), Stewarts & Lloyds (1903).6 
Method 
Our case analysis centres upon a close re-reading of the text ‘Quaker enterprise in biscuits: 
Huntley and Palmers of Reading 1822-1972’ (Corley, 1972), an authoritative account of the 
company’s history, according to the website that accompanies the archives. In addition, we reviewed 
and analysed the wider literature on Quaker business practice and corporate law. Thomas Corley 
wrote his study of Huntley and Palmers (H&P) during the 1970s when he was a management 
historian at the University of Reading, where he enjoyed access to the company archives held in the 
university library and nearby local museum. The University Library held the documentary materials, 
mostly business records, while the museum material consists of around 7,000 items including biscuit 
tins, photographs, oral histories, and marketing and advertising collateral dating from 1822 to the 
1980s.  One of the key strengths of Corley’s work is his use of references, dates, and sources, as 
well as his close proximity to, and knowledge of, the archival records. 
Our analysis is a critical re-reading of Corley’s text. Although Corley was not commissioned 
by the company to write a corporate history, we acknowledge the limitations of drawing upon 
corporate histories. There are potential issues relating to selectivity bias and de-contextualization 
(Rojas 2010), social legitimization bias (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009), constraints on reflexivity 
(Megill 2007), and a predisposition to an objectivist narrative form (Rowlinson, Hassard and 
Decker, 2014). Despite these criticisms, we reflexively locate our case analysis as a critical re-
reading against the grain (Clark, 2004). Our re-interpretation aims to position itself as an 
analytically-structured history (Rowlinson, et al., 2014) that connects changes in corporate law to 
                                                 
6 From Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History - https://www.gracesguide.co.uk . 
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subsequent changes in ownership and control of the firm, and changes in firm objectives, linkages 
that Corley does not emphasize in his text.  
We approached Corley’s text with incorporation of the firm in 1898 as an ‘anchor’ event, in 
order to examine the subsequent effects on capital structure and the socio-economic objectives of 
the firm. Thus, we began with two a priori themes: “ownership and control” and “(non) socio-
economic practice” to guide our analysis (see King, 2004; King and Brookes, 2017; 2018). We 
coded the text using a template analysis approach adapted from Burton and Galvin (2018) that 
combines template analysis and temporality. Template analysis is a distinctive and 
epistemologically flexible type of thematic analysis that has recently gained traction in management 
and organisation studies (Burton, 2018; Burton and Galvin, 2018; Waring and Wainwright, 2008). 
While we had two a priori themes to guide our analysis, we coded Corley’s text interpretively in 
order to uncover sub-themes and related themes that related to our research interests. Furthermore, 
given the long, longitudinal nature of events, the templates were organized into time-periods to trace 
change events chronologically (Burton and Galvin, 2018).   
Case of Huntley & Palmers 
Although H&P can be traced back to 1822 with the formation of J. Huntley & Son, it wasn’t 
until June 1841 that Quakers Thomas Huntley and George Palmer settled a partnership agreement 
for a biscuit manufacturing company based in Reading, Berkshire. The agreement included 
provision to buy the share of the other should the partnership be wound up. The initial capital for 
the partnership was supported by a loan by William Golding, a Quaker iron-founder. By 1845-6, the 
business had grown; turnover had reached nearly £7,000, with profits exceeding £1,000 for the first 
time, and sixteen people were employed.  
With strong growth in the first few years, and George having imaginative ambitions – more 
so than Thomas – the partners negotiated the purchase of a factory for £1,800 on a mortgage loan. 
To begin to mechanize the factory, purchases of plant and machinery amounted to c. £1,000, in 
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addition to capital required to refit the factory. By 1848-49, turnover had increased to £18,000, and 
profits to nearly £3,500 allowing the partners to pay down some debt, invest in further production 
mechanization, and reduce consumer prices. By 1850-51, although turnover had increased to over 
£40,000, with a profit of just under £7,500, and the business was able to finance its growth via 
retained profits, discord began to emerge between Thomas and George. George was concerned about 
his workload, and he also felt that his partner’s diligence was below par. In addition, George had 
raised a question about bringing his brother, Samuel Palmer, into the business as a manager,  
potentially offering him a partnership at an undetermined later date. Thomas refused, unless his only 
son, Henry Huntley, was given a similar opportunity. George declined. Eventually, as is the common 
practice among Quakers, the matter was referred to the Society, and three Quakers acted as 
arbitrators. As a result, a book-keeper was appointed to relieve Thomas; his son, Henry, went to 
Colchester to receive professional training, while Samuel was appointed to a sales role in Reading.     
The early to mid-1850s were a buoyant period for the business. William Isaac Palmer, 
brother to George, was brought into the business as factory manager, and the workforce now totalled 
around one-hundred and fifty. Between 1852 and 1855, a further factory, land, and houses was 
purchased. Profits in 1855-6 had grown to over £12,000 on turnover of £105,000. In 1856, Samuel 
and William Isaac had been promised partnerships, but for the time being were awarded 
remuneration by profit-share. Henry Evans Huntley – son of Thomas – was not brought in on the 
same basis at this time. Thomas Huntley died in 1857, leaving an estate of £35,000, and the 
partnership was dissolved.  
The ‘second’ partnership comprised the three Palmer brothers, following payments of 
around £34,000 to Henry, and that partnership continued until 1874.  In 1857-8, George took this 
opportunity to take a step back from the day-to-day affairs of the business to focus on his public 
interests. The period between 1857-8 and 1873-4 was a further buoyant period for the business with 
turnover increasing by almost a factor of six, and net profit to over £84,000. Over a similar period, 
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significant capital was invested in the factory sites. The full re-developed site was declared ‘open’ 
in late-1873, with around 2500 employees. 
Between 1874 and 1893, the partnership transcended the next generation. George Palmer’s 
eldest sons – George William and Alfred – joined the business as apprentices in 1868 and 1869 
respectively and were admitted to partnership in 1874. Samuel’s son, Ernest Palmer, George’s third 
son, Walter, also became partners in 1879 and 1880. Later, Samuel’s younger sons – Charles, 
Howard and Albert – became partners in 1883, 1887, and 1892 respectively. By 1893, the capital 
was distributed equally, 50% owned by George Palmer and his three sons, and 50% by Samuel and 
his four sons. However, in 1887, Samuel’s health began to deteriorate, and his two elder sons took 
over his duties in the London office. Brothers George and William Isaac also ceased to be involved 
with the business through death or infirmity. William Isaac died suddenly in 1893, and in the mid-
1890s George’s health worsened. In all but a formal sense, the management of the business had been 
passed to the second generation. By 1898, the sons of George and Samuel had only produced seven 
sons, and concern arose about the ability of the family to fulfil roles in the business in the future. Of 
the grandchildren, only five entered the business. The problem of succession was compounded by 
trying to maintain financial control of the business. At this time, the partnership was under the 
control of three brothers from the first generation and seven children from the second generation.   
H&P’s main competitors embraced incorporation in the late nineteenth century. Jacob’s had 
gone public in 1883, Carr and Co in 1894, Meredith and Drew in 1891, MacKenzie & MacKenzie 
in 1898, and later Peek Frean in 1901 and MacFarlane Lang in 1904. Given this, the media reported 
that H&P would ‘go public’, though this was denied by the company. Nonetheless, in 1894 H&P 
instructed the Quaker accountants, Price Waterhouse, to investigate the benefits of incorporation. 
The accountants set out the advantages and drawbacks of incorporation, with one major drawback 
being the business might “have thrust upon it persons whom they don’t want” (Morley, 1972, 151). 
At least initially, the matter was not acted upon. However, after George died in 1897, the surviving 
partners immediately pursued preparations for incorporation, and this was subsequently enacted in 
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March 1898. The new company’s share capital was fixed at £2.4m (£1m in ordinary shares and 
£1.4m in 4% preference shares), owned equally by George’s three sons on one side, and Samuel’s 
four sons on the other. The Articles of Association referred to ‘George Palmer’ and ‘Samuel Palmer’ 
shares; each type offered to sale to the relevant side of the family before being offered to the other. 
In other words, at least initially, the capital structure remained unaltered, and the limited company 
was a family partnership within a joint-stock company structure.  In this respect, H&P was similar 
to other large British family partnerships that became limited liability corporations but issued no 
shares or debentures to the public in order to retain family control of the business (Payne 1967).  
In 1904, Ernest Palmer, who was also a director of the Great Western Railway, proposed 
that the Board elect a Chairman and Deputy Chairman – George William was then elected Chairman 
and Ernest as Deputy – and that a new management structure be created to attract new skills and 
expertise. Despite these changes, H&P’s performance in its home market reduced, and the 
shareholders began drawing down all of the profits as dividends, though in 1905 the company was 
still the 38th largest corporation in the UK (Payne 1965). Howard Palmer replaced George William 
Palmer as Chairman in 1906, and Charles Palmer became Deputy Chairman. Despite the 
shareholders being Board members, Howard implemented a new era of professionalism, though 
sales continued to fall, and many directors became pre-occupied with outside interests. Ernest, who 
continued on the Board, expressed concern regarding H&P’s strategic direction. Charles had similar 
concerns, though the Board did not accept his proposal that a reserve fund be created to protect the 
company. He stood down in 1912 to be replaced by Eustace Palmer.  
In the same period, the economic environment was volatile, and over-production and 
reduced demand encouraged closer co-operation between manufacturers. The trade association – 
the Association of Biscuit Manufacturers (ABM) – was set up in 1903 to promote the interests of 
trade and collective action. However, the two largest manufacturers, Peek Frean and H&P, declined 
to join, and Peak Freen instead ramped up its marketing and discounts to distributors, resulting in 
tit-for-tat pricing in the industry and increasing competitive pressures. Given this competitive 
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context, a firm of London brokers, Mitchell Hain & Co, approached various biscuit manufacturers 
with a proposal to amalgamate into a public company, under a combine of H&P. The core logic of 
the proposal was to defend against the ‘cheap’ biscuit trade initiated by CWS, one of the new 
competitors that had entered the biscuit market in 1873. These cooperative ties were initially resisted 
by Howard Palmer and the other directors, and the plan for consolidation collapsed.         
The years either side of the First World War were characterised by restless labour relations, 
as the firm reacted to volatile markets. During 1911, many employees unionized to campaign for 
better wages and working conditions, following a series of redundancies. The local newspaper, the 
Berkshire Chronicle, noted that low wages at the company were creating and sustaining depression 
in Reading. Despite raising wages in 1912 (for the first time since 1900), in 1916 there was a 
significant strike at the firm. The partners refused to discuss wages with the unions, but did 
eventually establish a Workers’ Representative Committee. 
By July 1919, the Chairman, Howard Palmer, was advocating that H&P be converted into a 
public company. He was preoccupied by three related matters. First, he was concerned that there 
would be too few family members – and hence family shareholders – to sustain the company, and 
that this would negatively impact family control. Second, with estate duty at 20% on estates over 
£1m, premature deaths might lead to the forced sales of shares to meet death duties. Third, capital 
was being used to maintain control rather than improve the competitive position of the company. It 
was becoming clear to Howard that the only way to address all of these issues was to either 
consolidate with other firms and revive the ideas turned down in 1912, ‘go public’ on its own, or 
sell out to another conglomerate.  
The H&P Board initially decided to ‘go public’. But, before proceeding – since the second 
generation was reaching very mature years – members of the third generation affected a ‘virtual 
take-over’ of the firm, which was not resisted. However, Howard, with the Board’s support, was 
also engaged in conversations with Peek Frean about a possible merger. After six months of 
negotiations, the ordinary shares (excluding preference shares and debentures) were exchanged on 
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a ratio of 52.2% to 47.5%, in favour of H&P, for shares in a new holding company capitalized at 
£2.5m. The holding company, Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd, was incorporated in December 
1921, with Howard Palmer elected as Chairman and Arthur Carr of Peak Frean as Vice-Chairman. 
The merger between H&P and Peek Frean allowed the two companies to benchmark key 
performance indicators against each other, and this was quickly followed by a range of efficiency 
advancements, such as cost reductions, economizing on labour and wages, changing distribution 
towards retail, and more disciplined approaches to financial management. However, Howard Palmer 
did not live to see this new direction, having died in 1923. Despite cost reductions and innovations, 
profits halved, which initiated closing a factory and making various detrimental changes to the 
labour force and wages. These changes included discharging some male workers at age eighteen, 
turning over work to lower-paid female employees, and force-closing the factory until various new 
terms were agreed by the workforce. All was not well as profits continued to fall.  
In 1926, Eustace resigned as Chairman due to health reasons. He was replaced by Eric and 
Cecil was appointed his Deputy. Eric introduced a more informal style, but he continued to be 
concerned about the competitive environment. Despite increasing buyer discounts, it was clear that 
‘cheap’ biscuit manufacturers were exploiting demand for lower-priced biscuits, and further cost 
savings in H&P were required. A system of ‘scientific management’ was introduced throughout the 
factory resulting in net savings of over £90,000. Despite these cost savings, and the investment of 
retained earnings and reserves in capital projects, the company had effectively run out of money by 
the mid-1930s. The Board examined every conceivable opportunity – from selling off assets, selling 
preference shares, and further collaboration with Peek Frean – to minimize costs. The outcome was 
to establish a Group Experimental Department for innovation and economization. Management 
consultants, Urwick Orr & Partners, worked with the Board to consolidate administration and 
clerical functions in a new building, and by 1937 Reginald Palmer had persuaded the Board that the 
key to unlocking further efficiency advancements was the full mechanization of production. 
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By 1940, only six family members formed part of the Executive, with four from outside the 
family.  Following hard years of rationing from 1945 to 1952, the company’s fortunes seemed more 
assured. In the first-half of the 1950s, output increased by nearly 50% as post-war demand returned 
and the technology-equipped factories had come into operation. Dramatic increases in output 
culminated in the building of a new production and packing facility near Liverpool in 1955, and so, 
by around 1960, the production had been technologically-upgraded to a fully automated facility. 
The price for these long-term investments was significant, with capital spend in the 1950s amounting 
to an average of c. £300,000 a year. While profits had grown substantially, the rate was not high 
enough to cover this kind of capital investment. With Peek Frean mirroring H&P’s spend on new 
technology, the Group had borrowed £1.5m from preference and ordinary shareholders, and bank 
overdrafts neared the limit of £3.5m. The 1957 ‘credit crunch’ was therefore very untimely, and the 
Group estimated it would need £3.5m over five years.   
The advising bank highlighted the issues: offering further ordinary shares would weaken the 
family’s control, while other methods were unviable because the Group companies held preference 
shares outside the Group, which ranked higher than ordinary shares. Thus, in 1958, the Group took 
over both companies’ preference shares and consolidated them with its own, effectively altering the 
capital structure of the Group so that H&P and Peek Frean both became wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of the Group.  This permitted the Group to create some debenture stock which could clear the £3.5m 
of debt, but also raise new funds (£2m). As the same directors sat on the Group and ‘unit’ boards, 
the Group now exercised effective control over the operations of the H&P and Peek Frean ‘units’, 
despite them each continuing to be run as largely separate enterprises.  
Notwithstanding the cost savings, the Group was still falling short of its profit ambitions due 
to operational inefficiencies and intense competitive pressure.  Thus, under the guidance of Gordon 
Palmer, two new automated plants were constructed in 1957 and 1960. Consultants were also 
employed to review its sales organisation and assess how sales and profitability could be increased. 
They recommended further consolidation in sales, marketing and distribution, and the Group shifted 
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to a more formalised planning and control system to more-effectively link production, marketing 
and sales. At the same time, the mid to late-1950s witnessed the growth of supermarkets, and ‘own-
brand’ products began to materialise.  Consolidation was also on the cards: the Group combined 
with the Liverpool-based arm of Jacob’s, with Jacob’s becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd in 1960, increasing the share capital by £1.5m to £7.2m. 
Three Jacob’s directors joined the Group board. The then Vice-Chairman of the Group, and 
Managing Director of Peek Frean, sought to enhance the enlarged Group’s integration and 
efficiency, and a new wave of professional management and efficiency advancements ensued. Stage 
2 of the new era began with the Group appointing further consultants to achieve more economies in 
production and marketing by consolidating factory organisation. By 1968, the new Group structure 
unfolded, with three divisions: Biscuits, Overseas, and Tins and Light Engineering, which relegated 
Huntley & Palmer as a ‘division’ of the wider Group. Roderic O’Connor, Chairman and Managing 
Director of Jacob’s, was appointed as the Managing Director of the Biscuit Division, known as 
Associated Biscuits Ltd, while the three ‘units’ were now only retained as ‘brands’.  
Discussion 
Games provide a useful lens through which to analyse the H&P case. Games, as 
communities, include players, supporters, managers and management teams, commentators, 
referees, analysts, administrators, sponsors, regulators, etc. There are also those who develop and 
produce games and game matériel, clubs, and associations, while administrative and rule-making 
practices are also integral to games. In turn, there are layers to the ‘rules of game’.  So, for instance, 
there may be habitual practices – such as a team forming a huddle prior to a football game – that 
come to be law-like, as well as quasi-laws that are typically implemented by a referee, whose 
decisions are supported by a quasi-legal system consisting of a hierarchy of disciplinary committees, 
appeal processes, etc. There may also be local by-laws, such as a club rule that all substitutes must 
be given game-time. And these quasi-legal rules operate in a complex legal environment where the 
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law of the land applies. For instance, a player will not be brought to court for handling a ball in 
football, but the courts might become involved if one player viciously assaults another. In turn, all 
of these law-like rules, quasi-legal local and general rules, as well as the law of the land, are subject 
to interpretation and change. 
  To add to the complexity, communities of practice associated with a game will invariably 
have a heterogeneous and competing set of values, and indeed it is this tension that often vitalises 
the community. For instance, games routinely foster heterogeneous and sometimes competing 
values such as playing a game for its own sake, winning, losing graciously, respecting one’s 
opponent, fairness, healthy competition, honesty, teamwork, individualism, etc. And there may also 
be a temporal tension between some values, such as the desire to win this particular game versus the 
desire to succeed over the longer term. The rules, values and practices of games also change over 
time, though these changes often occur slowly – a game of football played a century ago is still 
recognisable as the same game played today – which is why historical, long-term longitudinal case 
studies are an appropriate methodology in studying such change.  
 In our discussion that follows, we focus on how the legal ‘rules of the game’ – specifically 
changes to corporate law enacted in the mid-nineteenth century – profoundly affected the subsequent 
practices of Quaker businesses such as H&P, and came to supplant the quasi-legal rules that had 
previously governed their practice. This effect resulted in them losing, during the early twentieth 
century, control and ownership over the firms they had founded. H&P is an illustrative case, but key 
parts of its narrative are shared by many other Quaker businesses (e.g., Cadbury, 2010; Hyde, Ellert, 
and Killing. 1991; Kavanagh and Brigham, 2018; 2019). While earlier scholars have remarked that 
Quakers lost control of the businesses they created, scholarship has yet to trace the exogenous  
relationship between changes in corporate law (‘rules’) and the subsequent effects of those changes 
on the way Quaker businesses were owned and managed.            
Our long, longitudinal case analysis shows that the quasi-legal (Quaker) logic was 
supplanted, from the late-nineteenth century, by a dominant legal logic, which created and operated 
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a different set of rules of the game. The Quaker logic, which was quasi-legal in nature, was founded 
on maximising socio-economic outcomes, family partnership was the preferred organisational form, 
and business practice was self-governed within the Quaker community. In fact, Britain Yearly 
Meeting communicated frequently with its members on quasi-legal rules to do with business 
practice. The scope of advice ranged, for example, from informing members that they had a moral 
duty to repay ‘just’ debts, to be honest and truthful in all business dealings, to avoid bankruptcy, not 
to trade beyond means or capability, and to keep clear accounts (Tibbals, 2017). Oversight of the 
rules was vested in local and area Quaker meetings, often to Elders. Although the effectiveness of 
this kind of oversight has been recently disputed (Sahle, 2018), most Quaker scholars have remarked 
that local and area Quaker meetings acted to ensure compliance and retained the ultimate sanction 
of expelling a member from the Society for continued transgressions and bringing the Society into 
disrepute (King, 2014; Tibbals, 2017). As Walvin noted (1997,  78),  Quakers “had to satisfy not 
only their partners, customers and suppliers, but also their fellow Friends [Quakers] – they were 
expected to open their ledgers, show their receipts, reveal their bills and correspondence to satisfy 
their co-religionists”. Moreover, internalizing the quasi-legal rules of the game by Quakers served 
to strengthen the Quaker as a figure of honesty and integrity (Prior & Kirby, 1993). 
The Quaker quasi-legal logic went into decline partly because of internal changes within the 
Quaker community. For example, in the mid-nineteenth century, Quakers were no longer expelled 
for marrying non-Quakers, by 1871 Quakers were permitted to enter English universities, and in the 
1830s Quakers were eligible to stand for Parliament (Dandelion, 2019). According to Dandelion, in 
the mid-nineteenth century the State was beginning to tolerate Quakers, and Quakers tolerated the 
State. These internal changes within the Society, along with falling membership, disrupted the quasi-
legal logic of the Quakers, occurring at the same time as a competing, legal logic emerged centred 
on the idea of the corporation as a separate legal entity, with shareholders having limited liability, 
and where maximising shareholder wealth trumped the notion of maximising socio-economic 
wealth.    
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How did changes to the legal rules that governed the new market economy inform the future 
of Quaker businesses such as H&P? Wagner-Tsukamoto (2008, 843) have argued that in general 
terms Quaker businesses and the Quaker ethic failed because “institutional structures and 
mechanisms of the market economy were ignored”. In our view, this type of generalized argument 
is too simplistic and reductionist.  
First, our case analysis shows how access to external share capital was a strategic imperative 
for the firm. Incorporation and limited liability had fundamentally changed the capitalization of 
family firms in the UK at the turn of the twentieth century. Whereas Quaker firms previously held 
an advantage in being able to access cost-effective capital in the Quaker kinship and social network, 
easier access to external shareholder capital through market mechanisms undermined this economic 
advantage. Furthermore, mechanization, fast-paced technological change and consolidation in the 
industry increased the demand for capital and strengthened competitive intensity. For H&P, the 
capital needed to survive and prosper exceeded the levels that could be raised via retained profits or 
from other Quaker industrialists that earlier generations of the family partnership were able to draw 
upon. To compound the problem, the industries Quaker firms populated were highly capital-
intensive and integrated (e.g., transport, manufacturing) or intensely competitive and subject to fast-
paced growth and internationalisation (eg. chocolate and biscuits).  
Incorporation enabled transferable shares to be issued to attract external share capital from 
non-family (and non-Quaker) investors (such as through merger) to either provide liquidity to 
finance expansion, withstand competitive dynamics, or enable existing family members to exit the 
firm. Our case analysis shows how H&P consolidated manufacturing and production to achieve 
scale in a merger with rival Peek Frean in 1921, forming Associated Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd 
(ABM), and later ABM merged with Jacobs, ultimately diluting the family’s previously 
concentrated shareholding. By the late 1960s, following a capital reorganization at ABM, H&P had 
become a division and brand within ABM, losing its identity as a separate Quaker firm. As Stephen 
Morland (quoted in Child, 1964, 312) summed up at the Conference for Friends in Industry in 
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Bristol, 1959: “Some have expanded so greatly that their Quaker character has been lost; some have 
failed and closed; some have been merged in larger combines; and some have had no Quakers to 
carry on.” 
Second, incorporation and limited liability had an effect not only on the capital structure of 
family firms, but it also challenged the primacy of the socio-economic objectives of Quaker family 
firms. Family firms often hold heterogeneous objectives that endeavour to balance profit generation 
with the social and emotional needs of family members of the firm (Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-
Mejia, 2012; Neckerbrouck, Mueleman and Manigart (in press) and wider society. While Quaker 
family firms were not resistant to creating an economic surplus, socio-economic objectives were 
also vitally important to Quaker owner-managers and to the wider Quaker community. Scholarship 
of other Quaker firms such as Cadbury have noted similar observations (eg, Cadbury, 2010; 
Fincham, 2017; Walvin, 1997; Windsor, 1980; King, 2014).  
However, in contrast to this scholarship, our case analysis highlights that the socio-economic 
objectives of Quaker firm H&P was supplanted by economic  and market objectives. We identify 
that as the share capital of H&P became less concentrated in family hands, the Quaker character of 
the firm diminished, and the firm turned to management practices that would have been contrary to 
the earlier advice and guidance published by Britain Yearly Meeting. To add to this, as the firm 
grew, family representation in key managerial positions also diminished. Gomez-Mejia, et al. (2007) 
noted that family firms often suffer from principal-principal conflicts that arise between family and 
non-family shareholders (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, Berrrone, and Makri, 2017) due to substantive 
differences in the extent to which socio-economic goals are pursued (Neckerbrouck, Mueleman and 
Manigart in press). In our case analysis, we have shown how the primacy of socio-economic 
objectives weakened as the heterogeneity of the capital structure of the firm was expanded. In 
particular, as the share capital expanded and its ownership diversified, firm efficiency became a key 
driver for shareholders throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, illustrating the 
type of principal-principal conflicts that existed between Quaker and non-Quaker principals. With 
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investments in new technologies and mechanization required to advance efficiency and meet the 
financial demands of shareholders, the impacts on the workforce and division of labour were 
significant. Whereas Quaker employers had a reputation for care of employees (Fincham, 2017; 
Tibbals, 2019; Turnbull, 2014), the firm had advanced various efficiency initiatives in order to 
compete effectively, and labour relations at the firm significantly worsened both after incorporation 
and over time as the capital structure diversified. For example, with low-pay, poor working 
conditions and significant redundancies in 1910, the workforce at H&P unionized and went on strike 
in 1911 and again in 1916 after unfair treatment of a group of female workers. As noted by 
Neckerbrouck, Mueleman and  Manigart (in press), enhancing firm efficiency is a key driver for 
value creation and attracting external investors, but efficiency can often conflict with the socio-
economic goals of the family, especially when it involves restructuring and cost reductions.   
From the perspective of H&P’s financial objectives, incorporation, in many ways, had the 
desired effect as the firm experienced significant growth in the first half of the twentieth century. In 
addition to the ‘growth story’ of H&P, Quaker firms Cadbury and Rowntrees also experienced 
significant growth following incorporation (Cadbury, 2010; Fincham, 2019; Vernon, 2013). 
However, our case analysis highlights a ‘dark side’ to incorporation that puts financial and socio-
economic objectives in competition and runs the risk of socio-economic objectives being supplanted 
by purely financial objectives.  
We contribute to the management and organizational history literature in the following ways: 
First, we characterize incorporation and limited liability as legal rules of the game that govern the 
way that actors who play the game behave. Incorporation and limited liability supplanted the quasi-
legal rules that Quaker businesses had previously operated within with some success. Second, we 
trace the effects that incorporation and limited liability had on the way in which family firms 
capitalized, and we show how the capitalization of firms is affected by competitive dynamics, and 
vice versa. Third, in light of the changing legal ‘rules’ and subsequent heterogeneous capital 
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structure, we show how H&P was unable to sustain its socio-economic ambitions across successive 
generations. We locate the tension between financial and socio-economic objectives as a principal-
principal problem that often bedevils family firms that wish to capitalize to survive or prosper. Thus, 
in contrast to Wagner-Tsukamoto (2008), we do not find evidence that the mechanisms of the market 
economy were ignored; rather the opposite. Quaker businesses embraced, perhaps with mixed 
emotions, the legal and financial rules of the market, and while the businesses they founded grew 
into large and successful enterprises, the Quaker families eventually lost control of the businesses 
they founded.   
Endings and the End of Business 
Early Quaker businesses were able to create supportive social networks to develop their 
commercial interests. Their religious convictions that emphasised individual self-reliance, thinking 
for oneself, and self-discipline, enabled Quakers to be at the heart of industrialisation and early 
capitalism in the United Kingdom. However, over only a few decades in the first-half of the 
twentieth century, many Quaker businesses went ‘out’ of business – in the literal and metaphorical 
sense. Instead, they began putting greater effort into domains such as education, social work and 
campaigning for international peace and justice in a significant way after the First World War. We 
have shown how H&P, and Quaker businesses more generally, were eclipsed by a number of 
changes, most significantly changes in the rules of the game enacted by changes in company law. 
The business system that Quakers were integral in making, based on the integration of financial and 
socio-economic objectives, became less viable with changes in the socio-legal status – and 
subsequently the capital structure – of organizations. We have argued that this aspect of management 
and organizational history, especially in relation to Quaker or other religious businesses, has been 
neglected in the literature. Our close re-reading of Corley’s account of H&P provides, we suggest, 




Because changes in the legal status of the firm did not have an immediate effect, it is more 
difficult to determine the scope of the effect of socio-legal changes. Business and management 
historians are particularly well-placed to contribute to understanding the nuanced interplay of 
continuity and change because they take a long view and bring historical sensitivity. Starting from 
an historical anchor event and using a template analysis to identify relevant themes pertinent to our 
interest, we have shown how changing the rules of the game for business activity and growth brought 
about changes in the way firms raised capital, limited liability and were managed. We have shown 
how the Quaker socio-economic objectives became increasingly extraneous and the importance of 
analysing this through understanding the impact of a changing socio-legal context.  
Debate about the role, scope and legitimacy of the modern corporation is becoming 
increasingly widespread, often emphasising the need to rebalance organizations and society 
(Mintzberg, 2015). There is then a growing interest and focus on the legal status of the corporation 
and how this frames economic and social activity. We have pointed to the future by looking back at 
one Quaker business in detail, connecting the firm’s history to the wider context of legal changes. 
It is our hope that others will follow in exploring the relationship between corporate law and 
corporate forms. Sir Adrian Cadbury acknowledged (foreword, King, 2014) that a return to Quaker 
business practice in a public limited company is impossible. Our historical case analysis points in 
the same direction. However, despite this pessimism, interest in no-longer-alternative organizational 
forms such as the B-Corporation, common or cooperative ownership and employee-ownership are 
gaining traction, as a way in which to balance financial and socio-economic objectives (e.g., Bauer 
and Umlas, 2017; Moroz, Branzei, Parker, and Gamble, 2018). For example, B-corporation 
accreditation requires the amendment of Articles of Association to reflect socio-economic 
ambitions. Similarly, the literature on prosocial organizing encourages common forms of ownership 
as a pre-requisite for prosociality (e.g., Peredo, Haugh, and McLean, 2018). 
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There are very few businesses today with an explicitly Quaker character7. Nonetheless, seen 
longitudinally, many Quaker values – integrity is business dealings, accountability of the impact of 
a business to a wider group of stakeholders, well-being of employees, to name a few – have become 
commonplace and taken for granted features in contemporary management practice. In this way, 
Quaker beliefs can also be understood as having been integrated into modern capitalism even if 
Quaker businesses themselves no longer exist as they once did. Drawing on our analysis of H&P, 
initiatives around new organizational forms can be understood as attempts to rewrite the rules of the 
game for twenty-first century pro-social businesses that draw on, replicate and reinvent, at least in 
part, Quaker concerns and priorities.  
Acknowledgements 
None 
Declarations of interest 
None 
References 
Alvesson, M, and Sköldberg, K. 2009. Reflexive methodology: new vistas for qualitative research 
(2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
Angell, S, and Dandelion, P. (Eds) 2017. Quakers, business and industry. PA, USA: Friends 
Association in Higher Education  
Bannerjee, S. 2008. “Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly” Critical 
Sociology ,34(1). 51-79 
                                                 
7 Although one notable exception is the Scott Bader Commonwealth which converted from a private limited company 
to a commonwealth structure in 1951 (see, Muers & Burton, 2018). Scott Bader Commonwealth’s constitution is 




Bauer, J, and Umlas, E. 2017. “Making corporations responsible: The parallel tracks of the B Corp 
movement and the business and human rights movement”. Business and Society Review 
122(3): 285-325. 
Berrone, P, Cruz, C, and Gomez-Mejia, L. 2012. “Socioemotional wealth in family firms: 
Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research” Family 
Business Review 25(3): 258-279. 
Burton, N. 2018. “The thatcher government and (de) regulation: modularisation of individual 
personal pensions” Journal of Management History, 24(2): 189-207 
Burton, N, and Galvin, P. 2018. “Using template and matrix analysis: A case study of management 
and organisation history research”. Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: 
An International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1108/QROM-04-2018-1626 
Burton, N, and Hope, A. 2018. Responsible business? What can we learn from the Quakers? In 
Snarr, M. and Ross. D. (Eds). Quakers, Politics, and Economics. PA, USA: Friends 
Association in Higher Education.  
Burton, N, and Turnbull, R. 2019. “The Quakers: Pioneers of Responsible Management”. In Burton, 
N., and Turnbull, R. (Eds), Quakers, Business and Corporate Responsibility (pp. 1-5). 
England: Springer Press.  
Cadbury, D. 2010. Chocolate Wars: From Cadbury to Kraft - 200 Years of Sweet Success and Bitter 
Rivalry (First Edition). United Kingdom: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Cazden, E. 2013. “Quakers, Slavery, Anti-slavery, and Race”. In Dandelion, P., and Angell, S. (Eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Child, J. 1964. “Quaker employers and industrial relations”. The Sociological Review, 12(3): 293–
315. 
Clark, E. 2004. History, theory, text: Historians and the linguistic turn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Corley, T. 1972. Quaker enterprise in biscuits: Huntley and Palmers of Reading, 1822-1972. United 
 
30 
Kingdom: Hutchinson Radius. 
Cottrell, P. 1980.  Industrial Finance 1830–1914: The Finance and Organization of English 
Manufacturing Industry, London and New York: Methuen  
Dandelion, P. 2019. The Cultivation of Conformity: Towards a General Theory of Internal 
Secularisation. United Kingdom: Routledge. 
Fincham, A. 2017. Factors supporting the rise of Quaker commerce, In Dandelion, P., & Angell, S 
(Eds). Quakers, Business and Industry, PA, USA: Friends Association in Higher Education. 
Fincham, A. 2019. Cadbury’s Ethics and the Spirit of Corporate Social Responsibility. In Burton, 
N, & Turnbull, R. (Eds), Quakers, Business and Corporate Responsibility (pp. 41-58). United 
Kingdom, Springer Press. 
Finn, M. 2007. The Character of Credit : Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Freeman, M. 2013. Quakers, business and philanthropy. In Angell, S. and Dandelion, P. (Eds). The 
Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Furtado, P. 2013. Quakers. Oxford: Shire publications.  
Gómez-Mejía, L, Haynes, K, Núñez-Nickel, M, Jacobson, K, and Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. 
“Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish 
olive oil mills”. Administrative science quarterly, 52(1):,106-137. 
Harris, R. 2013. “The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 33(2): 339-378. 
Holdsworth, W. 1922. “English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries”, The Yale Law 
Journal, 31(4): 382-407. 
Hyde, D, Ellert, J, and Killing. P. 1991. “The Nestlé Takeover of Rowntree: A Case Study”, 
European Management Journal, 9(1): 1-17. 
Ireland, P. 1984. “The Rise of the Limited Liability Company”, International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, 12(3): 239-260. 
 
31 
Ireland, P. 1996. “Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the 
Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality” The Journal of Legal 
History, 17(1): 41-73. 
Ireland, P. 2010. “Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate 
Irresponsibility” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34(5): 837-856. 
Jefferys, J. 1938. Trends in Business Organization in Great Britain since 1856, with Special 
Reference to the Financial Structure of Companies, the Mechanism of Investment and the 
Relations between Shareholder and Company. London: University of London. 
Jenks, L.H. 1927. The migration of British capital to 1875. New York: AA Knopf. 
Kahan, D. 2009. “Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical Perspective”, The 
Georgetown Law Journal, 97: 1085–1110. 
Kavanagh, D. and Brigham, M. 2018. The Quakers: forgotten pioneers. In Peltonon, T, Gaggioti, H 
and Case, P. (Eds). Origins of organizing. (p147-175). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Kavanagh, D, and Brigham, M. 2019. The Quakers and the Joint Stock Company: Uneasy 
Bedfellows. In Burton, N, and Turnbull. R. (Eds). Quakers, Business and Corporate 
Responsibility: Lessons and Cases for Responsible Management, United Kingdom: Springer 
Press.  
Kempin, F. 1960. “Limited Liability in Historical Perspective”. American Business Law Association 
Bulletin, 4(1): 11–34. 
King, N. 2014. Quakernomics: An Ethical Capitalism. London: Anthem Press. 
King, N. 2004. “Using templates in the thematic analysis of texts”, in Symon, G. and Cassell, C. 
(Eds), Qualitative Methods and Analysis in Organisational Research, (p256-270) London: 
Sage.  
King, N. and Brookes, J. 2017, Template Analysis for Business and Management Students 
(Mastering Business Research Methods), London: Sage.  
King, N. and Brookes, J. 2018. Thematic analysis in organizational research, In Cassell, C., Cunliffe, 
 
32 
A.L. and Grandy, G. (Eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Business and Management 
Research Methods: Methods and Challenges, (p.219-236). London: Sage. 
Kirby, M. 1993. Quakerism, entrepreneurship and the family firm in north-east England, 1780-1860, 
in Brown, J., and Rose. M. (eds.), Entrepreneurship, networks and modern business. (p.105-
126). Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Martin, G., Gómez–Mejía, L, Berrone, P, and Makri, M. 2017. “Conflict between controlling family 
owners and minority shareholders: much ado about nothing?” Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 41(6): 999-1027 
Megill, A. 2007. Historical knowledge, historical error: A contemporary guide to practice. Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Mintzberg, H. 2015 Rebalancing society: radical renewal beyond left, right and center. Oakland, 
California: Berrett-Koehler. 
Morley, B. 1993. Beyond Consensus: Salvaging Sense of the Meeting. Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill. 
Moroz, P, Branzei, O, Parker, S, and Gamble, E. 2018. “Imprinting with purpose: Prosocial 
opportunities and B Corp certification”, Journal of Business Venturing, 33(2): 117-129 
Muers, R, and Burton, N. 2018. “Can We Take the Religion out of Religious Decision-Making? The 
Case of Quaker Business Method”. Philosophy of Management, 1-12. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40926-018-0095-0 
Neckebrouck, J, Meuleman, M, and Manigart, S. (in press). “Governance implications of attracting 
external equity investors in private family firms”. Academy of Management Perspectives. 
Palmer, F. 1877. Private Companies; or How to Convert Your Business into a Private Company, 
and the Benefit of So Doing. London: Stevens and Sons. 
Payne, P. L. 1967. “The emergence of the large-scale company in Great Britain, 1870-1914.” The 
Economic History Review 20 (3)  519-542. 
Pearson, A., and Marler, L. 2010. “A leadership perspective of reciprocal stewardship in family 
firms.” Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice,  34(6), 1117-1124. 
 
33 
Peredo, A, Haugh, H, and McLean, M. 2018. “Common property: Uncommon forms of prosocial 
organizing”. Journal of Business Venturing, 33(5): 591-602. 
Perrow, C. 2002. Organizing America: Wealth, Power and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Prior, A., and Kirby, M. 1993. “The Society of Friends and the family firm, 1700–1830”. Business 
History, 35(4): 66-85 
Raistrick, A. 1950. Quakers in science and industry: being an account of the Quaker contributions 
to science and industry during the 17th and 18th centuries. Philosophical Library. 
Roberts, R. H. (Ed.). 2012. Religion and the transformation of capitalism: Comparative approaches. 
United Kingdom: Routledge. 
Rojas, F. 2010. “Power through institutional work: Acquiring academic authority in the 1968 Third 
World Strike”. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1263–1280. 
Rowlinson, M. 1988. “The early application of scientific management by Cadbury”. Business 
History, 30(4):,377-395. 
Rowlinson, M. 1995. “Strategy, structure and culture: Cadbury, divisionalization and merger in the 
1960s”. Journal of Management Studies, 32(2): 121-140. 
Rowlinson, M, and Hassard, J. 1993. “The Invention of Corporate Culture: A History of the 
Histories of Cadbury”. Human Relations, 46(3: 299–326. 
Rowlinson, M, Hassard, J, and Decker, S. 2014. “Research strategies for organizational history: A 
dialogue between historical theory and organization theory”. Academy of Management 
Review, 39(3): 250-274 
Sahle, E. 2015. “An investigation of early modern Quakers’ business ethic”. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64487/ on 19 April 2019 
Sahle, E. 2018. “Quakers, coercion, and pre‐modern growth: why Friends’ formal institutions for 
contract enforcement did not matter for early modern trade expansion”. The Economic History 
Review, 71(2): 418-436. 
 
34 
Saville, J. 1956. “Sleeping Partnership and Limited Liability, 1850–1856” The Economic History 
Review, 8(3): 418-433. 
Sleapwood, N. 2017. The Birmingham Quaker Business Community 1800-1900. In Angell, S and 
Dandelion, P. (Eds). Quakers, Business and Industry. PA, USA: Friends Association in Higher 
Education. 
Sleapwood, N. Forthcoming. “Albright and Wilson: Change in the Quaker business environment 
during World War 1”. Quaker Studies.  
Smith, B. M. 2004. A History of the Global Stock Market : From Ancient Rome to Silicon Valley. 
Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Tawney, R. H. 2017. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. United Kingdom: Routledge. 
Taylor, J. 2006. Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture 1800-
1870. London: Royal Historical Society 
Taylor, J. 2014. Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-
1870. Boydell & Brewer Ltd. 
Tibbals, K. 2014. “The theological basis behind Quaker businesses: a comparison of the first 150 
years to the beginning of the 20th century”. Unpublished thesis. USA: Earlham School of 
Religion. 
Tibbals, K. 2017. Early Quakers and “Just Debt”, In Dandelion, P., & Angell, S (Eds). Quakers, 
Business and Industry, PA: USA: Friends Association in Higher Education. 
Tibbals, K. 2019. Quaker Employer Conference of 1918. In Burton, N., & Turnbull, R. (Eds), 
Quakers, Business and Corporate Responsibility (pp. 61-77). United Kingdom, Springer 
Press. 
Tracey, P. 2012. “Religion and Organization: A Critical Review of Current Trends and Future 
Directions” The Academy of Management Annals, 6(1): 87-134 




Vernon, A. 2013. Quaker Business Man: The Life of Joseph Rowntree. United Kingdom: Routledge. 
Wagner-Tsukamoto, S. 2008. “Contrasting the Behavioural Business Ethics Approach and the 
Institutional Economic Approach to Business Ethics: Insights From the Study of Quaker 
Employers”. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(4): 835–850. 
Walvin, J. 1998. The Quakers: money and morals. London: John Murray. 
Waring, T, and Wainwright, D. 2008. “Issues and challenges in the use of template analysis: Two 
comparative case studies from the field”. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 
6(1). 
Windsor, D. 1980. The Quaker Enterprise: Friends in Business. London: Muller. 
